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## STM32L5 Series GPIO usage with TrustZone®

### Introduction

This document briefly describes the different security problems that can be caused by a non-suitable GPIO/peripheral security attribute combination and it provides details about the implementation on devices of the STM32L5 Series.

ArmV8-M TrustZone® aims to do the physical isolation of two execution environments: a secure world and a non-secure world, in which different sets of instructions ensure the valid execution of the code and prevent intruders from tampering or exploiting information from the secure into the non-secure world.

The Cortex-M33 implements the functionality of secure and non-secure world distinction at the hardware level, to ensure time efficient world switches. It uses source and origin memory addresses to check the security conditions.

The secure world ensures that no confidential data is available in non-secure world.

In the STM32L5 devices, depending on the peripherals and corresponding I/Os security attributes, some paths are protected by hardware, preventing the non-secure world from inferring any secure information.

Some other paths between peripherals and I/Os are not protected by hardware, so it is up to the user, through the secure code, to set up the suitable peripherals/GPIOs security attribute.

## **1**      **General information**

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This document applies to the STM32L5 Series Arm<sup>®</sup> Cortex<sup>®</sup> core-based microcontrollers.

*Note:*      *Arm is a registered trademark of Arm Limited (or its subsidiaries) in the US and/or elsewhere.*



## 2 Security levels

There are two different threat models:

- data leakage
- denial of service

The peripherals and corresponding I/Os security attribute must be well configured to prevent the non-secure world from having secure information or causing troubles to secure application.

**Table 1. Threat models**

Target protection	Security rationale
Secrets leakage	Protect user or manufacturer secrets
Denial of service	Make it more difficult for s/w attacks to make the final product behave badly

### 3 I/O security

When TrustZone® security is activated (TZEN = 1), each I/O pin of GPIO port can be individually configured as secure through the GPIOx\_SECCFGR registers.

After reset, each I/O pin of GPIO is set as secure. Only secure application can write to GPIOx\_SECCFGR registers to change the I/Os security attributes.

When an I/O pin is configured as secure:

- Its corresponding configuration bits for alternate function (AF), mode selection (MODE) and I/O data are read at zero/write ignore' (RAZ/WI) in case of non-secure access.
- Its corresponding bit for pull-up/pull-down configuration in standby mode (through PWR\_PUCRx and PWR\_PDCRx, x = A...H) becomes secure.
- The connection between the I/O and peripherals is allowed or blocked depending on the I/O connection to the peripheral, which are direct connection or through alternate function logic. and on the I/O and peripheral security attributes.

*Note:* The peripheral security attribute is defined through the global TrustZone® controller GTZC and TrustZone® security controller TZSC. For more details, please refer to the STM32L5 reference manual RM0438.

For more details, please refer to [Section 4 STM32L5 I/Os access rules when TrustZone is enabled](#).

## 4 STM32L5 I/Os access rules when TrustZone is enabled

Setting the GPIO in secure mode allows to be sure that the non-secure application will not be able to change alternate function selection or IO mode.

Therefore, it is guaranteed that:

- input data are not redirected to another peripheral
- output data are not replaced by those generated by another peripheral
- on-going secure communication is not corrupted

Some hardware protections are implemented to make sure that:

- data coming from a non-secure IO cannot be routed to a secure IP, in order to protect ongoing secure peripheral transactions
- data going to a non-secure pin do not originate from a secure peripheral to avoid potential secrets disclosure

Even if there are hardware protections, there are cases where the user must well configure the peripheral and I/O security attributes.

The access rules depend on:

- whether the I/O pin selection is done through alternate functions registers (such as USART, TIM...)
- the I/Os have analog switches, directly controlled by peripherals (such as ADC, OPAMP)
- there is direct connection between I/Os additional functions and peripherals (such as touch sense, DAC...)

These three cases are detailed in the 3 following subsections.

### 4.1 I/Os used as alternate function

When digital alternate function is used (input/output mode), in order to protect the data transiting from/to the I/O managed by a secure peripheral, the STM32L552xx and STM32L562xx add a secure alternate function gate on the path between the peripheral and its allocated I/Os. This gate behaves as following:

- If the digital peripheral is secure, the I/O pin must also be secure to allow input/output of data
- If the I/O pin is configured as non-secure, the connection with the secure peripheral is blocked by hardware
- If the digital peripheral is not secure, the connection is allowed regardless of the I/O pin security attribute

The table below summarizes the I/O behavior when configured as alternate function and depending on the security attribute of the I/O and peripheral.

**Table 2. Access Rules when the I/O is used as alternate function**

Security configuration		Alternate function logic	
Peripheral	Allocated I/O	Input	Output
Secure	Secure	I/O data	Peripheral data
Non-secure			
Secure	Non-secure	Zero	Zero
Non-secure		I/O data	Peripheral data

For example, when an UART is configured as a secure peripheral, this means that this UART is only allowed to be accessed by the secure world, not by the non-secure world.

However, in this case, when the UART pin is non-secure, the non-secure world cannot get the secure UART's information thanks to the hardware protection. This is illustrated in Figure xxx.

Figure 1. Secure UART connection to I/O allowed when the I/O is secure.





Figure 2. Secure UART connection to I/O not allowed when the I/O is non-secure.



## 4.2 I/Os with analog switches

When analog function with analog switch is used, the STM32L552xx and STM32L562xx add a secure gate on the analog switch. This secure gate controls the switch opening/closing and allows blocking the connection between the secure I/O and corresponding non-secure analog peripheral function.

Here, a different requirement applies to analog peripherals comparing to digital peripherals.

The goal is to prevent from capturing or corrupting pad level signals by using analog switches embedded in the GPIO cells. A typical example is to use a non-secure ADC to capture serial data transiting on a secure I/O.


The analog functions concerned by this rule (for instance when an IO is secure and analog peripheral is non-secure, the connection is blocked by hardware) are the following:

**Table 3. Access rules when the I/O is used as ADC/OPAMP/COMP input**

Peripheral	Analog function
ADCx (x = 1,2)	ADC12_INy (y = 1..16)
OPAMPx (x = 1,2)	OPAMPx_VINy (x = 1,2, y = 1,2)
COMPx (x = 1,2)	COMPx_INy (x = 1,2; y = 1,2)

**Table 4. Blocked connection between non-secure ADC/OPAMP/COMP and corresponding secure I/Os**

Security configuration		Input
Peripheral	Allocated I/O	
Secure	Secure	I/O data
Non-secure		Zero
Secure	Non-secure	I/O data
Non-secure		

**Figure 3. Blocked connection between non-secure ADC/OPAMP/COMP and corresponding secure I/Os**


### 4.3 I/Os used for additional functions with direct connections to peripherals

There are some direct connections between peripherals and I/Os additional functions that do not have a hardware protection and to which the user must pay attention.

Unsuitable configuration can result in leaking information from secure resource or causing malfunction of secure application.

For inputs there is the risk of secrets leakage.


For outputs there is more a risk to make the application fail.

To address this potential issue, it is up to the secure application to decide to configure these peripherals as secure even if they are not used by a secure application.

Table 5 summarizes the list of peripherals and I/Os connections that do not have a hardware protection linked to TrustZone®. Especially the listed signals (input and/or outputs) are not blocked when the I/O is set as secure and the associated peripheral is non-secure.

**Table 5. Direct connection between peripheral and I/O, with no protection**

Peripheral	Signal	I/O	Input	Output
DAC	DAC1_OUT1	PA4	-	X
	DAC1_OUT2	PA5	-	X
PVD	PVD_IN	-	x	-
RTC	RTC_OUT1	PC13	-	X
	RTC_OUT2	PB2	-	X
	RTC_TS	PC13	x	-
	RTC_REFIN	PB15	-	-
TSC	TSC_G1_IOy	PB12, PB13, PB14	x	-
	TSC_G2_IOy	PB4, PB5, PB6, PB7	x	-
	TSC_G3_IOy	PC10, PC11, PC12	x	-
	TSC_G4_IOy	PC6, PC7, PC8, PC9	x	-
	TSC_G5_IOy	PE10, PE11, PE12, PE13	x	-
	TSC_G6_IOy	PD10, PD11, PD12, PD13	x	-
	TSC_G7_IOy	PE2, PE3, PE4, PE5	x	-
	TSC_G8_IOy	PF14, PF15, PG0, PG1	x	-
TAMP	TAMP_INx, x = 1..8	PE6, PC13, PF7, PF8, PF9, PA0, PA1, PC5	x	-
	TAMP_OUTx, x = 1..8		-	x
PWR	WKUPx, x = 1..5	PA0, PC13, PE6, PA2, PC5	-	-
RCC	LSCO	PA2	-	x
UCPD1	UCPD1_CC1	PA15	x	x
	UCPD1_DB1	PB5	x	-
	UCPD1_CC2	PB15	x	x
	UCPD1_DB2	PB14	x	-
EXTI	EXTIx, x = 0..15	All I/Os	x	-

**Figure 4. Allowed connection between some specific non-secure signals and corresponding secure I/Os**




**Caution:** When an I/O is secure and it is used with a secure digital peripheral, some considerations are to be considered when we have some non-secure specific functions on this I/O. These specific functions are summarized in the [Table 5. Direct connection between peripheral and I/O, with no protection](#).

#### 4.3.1 Examples

When secure application sets PA4 as secure to be used as LPTIM2\_OUT, if the DAC peripheral is non-secure, it can be programmed to output data to PA4, potentially causing malfunction to the secure application.

When secure application sets PA0 as secure to be used as UART4\_TX, if the TAMP peripheral is non-secure it can be programmed to capture the USART input traffic through the TAMP\_IN signal.

The touch sense I/Os are grouped in groups of three or four IOs as shown in the [Table 5. Direct connection between peripheral and I/O, with no protection](#).

For every I/O, the touch sense peripheral could enable the analog switch and I/Os can be connected. So, it is possible to read secure I/O data with a non-secure I/O.

Consequently, depending on the application and criticality of secure information leaked to the non-secure world or non-secure information injected to the secure world, the DAC, TAMP, TSC peripherals should be configured as secure even they are not used by the application.

## 5 Basic example based on CubeMX

In the example, PA0 is used as UART4\_TX.

When PA0 is configured for UART4\_TX alternate function, with UART4 is non-secure (default state), it is still possible to configure PA0 as secure or non-secure as shown in the figure below:

Figure 5. UART4 non-secure, PA0 secure/non-secure

The screenshot shows the 'Pinout & Configuration' window in CubeMX. The 'Pinout' tab is active, and the 'GPIO Mode and Configuration' section is expanded. A table lists the pin configurations, with PA0 highlighted. Below the table, the 'PA0 Configuration' settings are visible, including the 'Pin Context Assignment' dropdown menu.


Pin Name	Signal on Pin	Pin Context Assignment	Pin Privileg	GPIO outp	GPIO mode	GPIO Pull...	Maximum out	Fast Mode	User Label	Modified
PA0	UART4_TX	Cortex-M33 non secure	n/a	n/a	Alternate F...	No pull-up ...	Low	n/a		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

PA0 Configuration :

- Pin Context Assignment: Cortex-M33 non secure (selected), Cortex-M33 secure, Cortex-M33 non secure
- GPIO mode: [Dropdown]
- GPIO Pull-up/Pull-down: No pull-up and no pull-down
- Maximum output speed: Low
- User Label: [Text Field]


Now, the UART4 is configured as secure through GTZC:

Figure 6. UART4 secure through GTZC



Once UART4 is configured as secure through GTZC, it is no more possible to configure PA0 as non-secure. This is because it is not possible to connect a secure peripheral to a non-secure I/O.

Figure 7. No more possible to configure PA0 as non-secure



## 6 Conclusion

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The STM32L5 Series provides a complete and cost-effective hardware security solution, which is used to enhance the security level of a typical IoT end node device. This is thanks to the hardware security features set it provides and hardware protections it implements preventing the non-secure world to accede secure information or to cause secure application trouble.

In the STM32L5 devices, based on the peripheral security attribute, the corresponding I/O security attribute follows some rules:

- Some paths between peripherals and I/Os are protected by hardware, so even if the secure application doesn't implement the right configuration, there is no risk to leak information to non-secure world or to receive wrong information from the non-secure world that may cause application malfunction.
- At the same time, there are some other paths between peripherals and I/Os that don't have any hardware protection.
- Consequently, it is up to the secure application to setup the right configuration.

So, despite the embedded protection mechanism provided inside the STM32L5, it is recommended that the application firmware configures in a consistent and coherent way the security state of each peripheral and its associated GPIO.

## Revision history

**Table 6. Document revision history**

Date	Revision	Changes
28-Jan-2021	1	Initial release.

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